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the political economy surrounding the cases.  Our results suggest that the commission’s 
decisions cannot be solely accounted for by the motive of protecting consumer surplus.  
The institutional and political environment does matter.  As far as firms’ influence is 
concerned, however, our data suggests that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Fusionskontrolle:  Evidenz anhand von 
Aktienmarkt-Daten 
 
 
iv 
 "...it boils down to whether you trust the agencies or the stock market. I'll take the 
stock market any day..."1 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. 
We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive 
consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to 
the merging firms.  We then account for the discrepancies between the actual decisions and 
what the stock market would have dictated in terms of the political economy surrounding the 
cases.  
 
An economic evaluation of merger control decisions seems particularly timely given that the 
Court of first instance of the European Community has recently overturned three prohibition 
decisions that were taken by the EU Commission (in the Airtours/First Choice, Tetra 
Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand cases).   In those cases, the Court found that the 
Commission had not established that the merger was anti-competitive but also pointed to 
important weakness in the Commission’s analysis.  For instance, the Court found that the 
Commission’s claims regarding potential anti-competitive effects were not clearly articulated 
and that the evidence presented by the Commission was insufficient.  Similar comments have 
been made with respect to another prominent prohibition decision, the General 
Electrics/Honeywell case, which is still under appeal.  These developments might raise the 
suspicion that systematic errors may have been made by the Commission, at least with respect 
to pro-competitive mergers.  Particular features of the Commission’s procedure have been 
highlighted, which may contribute to these errors (see, for instance, Kühn (2002) for a 
comprehensive discussion).  Among those, the Commission’s relative openness to capture 
figures prominently.  According to this claim, which has been endorsed by US antitrust 
authorities (see James, (2001)) in the context of the GE/Honeywell merger, influence - and in 
particular influence by competitors of the merging firms - can be brought to bear on the 
Commission.    
 
                                                 
1 Bruce Kobayashi, former economist at the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice 
(Antitrust Division) quoted in Fortune Magazine, April 14th, 1997.  
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 Possible shortcomings of the EU merger control procedures that have been alleged in the 
context of the prohibition of seemingly pro-competitive mergers may have broader 
application.  In particular, anti-competitive mergers, which are not prohibited (or properly 
amended), are often not subject to Court scrutiny or public debate.  As a result less evidence 
is typically available on the occurrence of such alternative errors.  Still, if the shortcomings of 
the Commission’s procedure that have been raised in the context of prohibitions prove 
significant, they should equally matter for the potential clearance of anti-competitive mergers.  
These are systemic features which potentially apply to all cases and it would seem that 
competitors, as well as merging firms, might be able to exercise influence in order to seek 
clearance.   
 
In sum, one may ask whether the EU merger procedures is prone to systematic errors and that 
the political economy of merger control may account for this.  The paper provides evidence 
on the merits of this issue.  
 
We consider a sample of some 164 mergers that have been reviewed by the EU and collect 
evidence on whether the stock market anticipated that these mergers were anti-competitive.   
We identify instances where the EU has prohibited mergers that the stock market regarded as 
pro-competitive (type I errors) as well as instances where the EU has failed to prevent 
mergers that were regarded as anti-competitive (type II errors).  We further investigate the 
source of these errors and focus on the potential influences that can be brought to bear on the 
decision making process.  Our empirical specification is derived from the framework of 
Neven and Röller (2002), in which the decisions of an antitrust agency are modeled in terms 
of the characteristics of the institutional environment in which it operates and the influences 
that firms can exercise.    
 
Our approach to the evaluation of merger control decisions differs from the existing literature 
in important ways.  The existing literature typically tries to account for merger decisions in 
terms of the competitive characteristics of deals and in terms of other variables, which control 
for the political economy environment.   For instance, Coate and Mc Chesney (1992) evaluate 
whether the decision to refer merger cases by the FTC can be well predicted by the factors 
listed in the merger guidelines (and in particular the concentration indices).2  Bergman et al. 
(2003) perform a similar exercise  for a sample of 96 EU merger cases, trying to account for 
                                                 
2 See Khemani and Shapiro (1993) for a similar exercise on Canadian enforcement. 
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 the decision to open a phase II investigation and the decision to prohibit in terms of the 
factors listed in the decisions.3  This approach provides important insights and in particular 
provides a test of whether the antitrust authorities give appropriate weights to the factors that 
they regard as important ex ante (for instance in published guidelines) and to factors that 
would be regarded as relevant according to the economic theory (like market shares, 
concentration and barriers to entry).  However, to the extent that many variables, like the 
importance of entry barriers and the prospect for co-ordinated effects, are not quantified and 
remain highly judgmental, this approach provides limited insights with respect to the overall 
quality of the decisions.  For instance, one expects that in most phase II and prohibition 
decisions, the Commission will have found or asserted that barriers to entry were high, or will 
have couched its analysis in such a way that post merger market shares will be high.  Hence, 
trying to account for decisions in terms of those factors provides a good test of the 
consistency of antitrust authorities (and their ability to recognize factors that will support 
negative findings) but may provide limited insights with respect to the overall quality of the 
competitive assessment.     
 
Of course, the endogeneity of the factors listed in the decisions could be alleviated if the 
competitive assessment was undertaken by a body which is independent from the decision 
maker.  In this respect, the US procedure may offer more scope, as independent evaluations4 
are undertaken by the bureau of economics and the bureau of competition, while decisions are 
made by a college of seven commissioner (whose appointment has a political dimension).  
Coate (2002) exploits this feature of the US procedure and his analysis of FTC's referral 
decisions is thus better suited to evaluate the importance of political control over the FTC.  In 
a model that accounts for interaction between congress and the president, Coate finds that 
political control affects the mergers decisions and the weight that is given to the competitive 
evaluation undertaken by the bureaucracy.  Such an approach would be difficult to implement 
in the European institutional framework where no independent evaluation is undertaken by 
the bureaucracy. 
                                                 
3 Beelders and Ozden (2002) also analyse a sample of mergers reviewed by the EU, trying to account for the 
decision to open a phase II investigation.   They focus on the external effects of merger control decisions across 
jurisdictions.  Using the insights of Barros and Cabral (1994), who analyse merger control decisions in 
international markets, they focus on the nationality of firms and the geographical distribution of their output as 
determinants of these decisions.   In order to control for the anti-competitive consequences of the mergers in the 
EU, these authors use the presence of merging firms in the EU (relative to other jurisdictions) as a proxy for 
market shares.   Whether this approach provides an adequate control for the anti-competitive consequences of the 
mergers under review is debatable. 
4 Of course, the evaluation undertaken by these two bodies could itself be made to please their political masters 
and hence could also be partly endogenous.   
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 Our approach differs from those in that we construct an alternative evaluation of the 
competitive consequences of the mergers reviewed by the EU.  As discussed below, the 
evaluation that can be inferred from the stock market reaction suffers itself from significant 
shortcomings.  However, the stock market approach has the advantage that it relies on an 
independent alternative assessment of the competitive consequences of the mergers against 
which the Commission's decision can be evaluated.  It does not rely on the information 
provided by the Commission decisions, which is possibly incomplete and endogenous. 
 
Our main findings are as follows. In terms of descriptive results our data suggest that the 
Commission made a type I error in 4 of the 14 prohibitions (some 28%).  Interestingly, our 
method has identified as type I errors two cases that have later been overturned on appeal 
(namely Airtours/First Choice and Tetra Laval/Sidel) and one case (General Electric 
/Honeywell) that has been highly controversial and is being appealed.  Regarding type II 
errors, we find that the Commission made an error in about 23 % of the cases that it has 
allowed without conditions.   
 
We further provide econometric evidence regarding the determinants of type I and II errors.  
Our results suggest that the commission’s decisions cannot be explained solely in terms of a 
motivation to protect consumer surplus.  In other words, the institutional and political 
environment does matter.  As far as firms’ influence is concerned, however, our data suggests 
that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive to firms’ interests.  In particular, there is no 
support in our data for the claim that “the Commission listens too much to competitors, at the 
expense of consumer interests”.  Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors – such as 
country and industry effects, as well as market definition and procedural aspects– do play 
significant roles. 
 
Section 2 presents our framework.  We outline a prototype model of merger control in which 
the change in competitors’ profit is an indicator of the merger’s competitive consequences.  
Section 3 derives our econometric specification and formulates our hypothesis.  Section 4 
describes our data.  Section 5 presents our econometric results.  Section 6 concludes. 
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 2.  The Evaluation of Mergers through Reactions in Stock Prices 
 
In order to assess the determinants of the performance of merger control, we need a measure 
of whether a merger is pro- or anti-competitive (i.e. increases or reduces consumer surplus).  
The empirical approach taken in this paper uses the stock market reactions for competitors’ in 
order to assess the competitive effects of a merger.  In particular, we classify a merger as pro-
competitive whenever the impact of the merger on competitors’ stock is negative.  
Conversely, a merger is presumed to be anti-competitive whenever competitors’ stock benefit.   
 
To illustrate the correspondence between the impact of a merger on consumer surplus and 
competitors’ profits, consider the well-known homogeneous Cournot model (see for example 
Vives 2000).  The consequences of a merger for merging parties, competitors and consumers 
are sketched in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency, Profits and Welfare 
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Assume that before the merger, N firms compete with identical marginal costs.  The merger 
involves M firms, where the merged entity has a lower marginal cost.  The marginal cost 
saving achieved by the merger (relative to the common pre-merger level) is represented on the 
horizontal axis and dubbed  (for efficiency).  The four curves in Figure 1 present e
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 respectively; the change in the profit of the merging parties (that is, the level of profit of the 
merged entity less the sum of the individual profits of the merging parties before the merger, 
denoted ); the change in the profit of competitors (all firms not involved in the merger, 
denoted ); the change in the consumer surplus (denoted CS ); and the change in welfare 
(defined as the sum of profits and consumer surplus denoted Π
mΠ
cΠ
m + Π c + C S ).  
 
There are five striking features from this figure.  First, it is immediately apparent that mergers 
are not attractive (both privately and in terms of welfare) if they do not achieve at least some 
level of efficiency. Second, the change in consumer surplus increases as the level of 
efficiency achieved by the merger increases. This accords with intuition, as part of the 
efficiency achieved by the merged entity will be passed on to consumers. Third, when the 
efficiency is large enough, the reduction in the number of competitors entailed by the merger, 
which normally leads to higher prices, is more than compensated by the effect of higher 
efficiency, which leads to lower prices, other things being equal. As indicated by Figure 1, 
there is a critical level of efficiency (e’), which ensures that the merger does not affect 
consumers. At this critical level, prices are unchanged. Fourth, the change in welfare is also 
increasing with the level of efficiency. Higher efficiency leads to higher aggregate profits 
(this is not shown) and higher consumer surplus, thereby increasing welfare. Figure 1 also 
indicates the level of efficiency, ẽ, which is required in order to ensure that welfare increases 
as a consequence of the merger. This level is naturally less than the level, which is required to 
ensure that consumers are not hurt. Fifth, and most importantly for our purpose, we observe 
that the change in profits accruing to competitors mirrors the changes in consumer surplus: 
profits to competitors fall as the level of efficiency achieved by the merger increases and the 
level of efficiency which ensures that competitors do not gain is exactly the level which 
ensures that consumers are not hurt. In other words, in this framework, if a merger hurts 
competitors, it will benefit consumers and vice versa5.  
 
The idea that mergers, which hurt competitors, will tend to be pro-competitive has long been 
recognized and has been first exploited by Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983).  They propose 
to use the stock market reaction to the announcement of a merger (a so called “event study”) 
to evaluate the impact of the merger on competitors’ profits. A positive reaction will normally 
indicate that the merger is expected to enhance competitors’ profits and hence that it will be 
anti-competitive (and vice-versa). The change in the value of competitors’ equity can also be 
                                                 
5 Assuming that competitors are not hurt to such an extent that would prefer to exit the industry.  
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 taken as a measure of the (discounted) additional profits that is expected to accrue to them as 
a consequence of the merger.6 
 
In what follows, we will adopt the “event study” methodology and identify the competitive 
implications for consumers by the reactions in the equity of competitors on the first day where 
the merger was reported on in the international press (the “announcement” day).  Before 
proceeding, however, we need to discuss the generality of the correspondence between the 
change in competitor’s profits and the change in consumer surplus – both in terms of 
underlying models of competition and empirical implementation.  We begin with the 
underlying micro-structure. 
 
As is shown by Farrell and Shapiro 1990 (see also Vives 2000, pp 101-102), homogenous 
Cournot games that satisfy some regularity conditions (such as uniqueness and stability) 
exhibit the property that CS  if and only if Π . In other words, using the impact on 
competitors to assess the impact on consumers is valid in such games (as in Figure 1).  
Moreover, the same property holds for games with product differentiation.  As is shown in 
Appendix 1, markets that can be characterized by Bertrand competition with product 
differentiation also display the correspondence between the signs of the change in CS and 
competitors’ profits, provided some regularity conditions are met again.
0> 0<c
7  Hence, it would 
appear that under some fairly standard assumptions, a correspondence between the impact of 
a merger on consumers and the impact on competitors’ profits holds for both homogenous 
Cournot markets as well as in markets with product differentiation and Bertrand price setting.   
 
Note that the correspondence is only valid insofar as the sign of the change in consumer 
surplus and competitors' profits are concerned. Clearly, if one is interested in a measure of 
consumer surplus, the above argument is of little use.  However, for the purposes of defining 
                                                 
6 Brady and Feinberg (2000) have used event studies to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the EU merger 
regulation and to evaluate the effects of particular news with respect to the development of EU procedures in 
specific cases (like the decision to open a phase II investigation).   They focus on merging firms and do not 
consider the effect on competitors.  A recent paper by Aktas et al. (2003) also undertakes event studies for 
merging partners but consider a larger sample of cases (which partly overlaps with ours).   They analyse whether 
the market considers the prospect for regulatory intervention in its initial assessment of the proposed mergers 
and test whether the EU is biased against mergers involving non EU firms.  
7 Interestingly, the correspondence between the sign in CS and competitors’ profits is lost in quantity games with 
product differentiation.  Intuitively, the proof in Appendix 1 breaks down under quantity competition, as the 
property of strategic substitutes imply that the merging firms output and the competitors’ output move in 
opposite directions. This implies that some prices may go up, while other prices may go down. Depending on the 
precise consumer preferences, consumer surplus may go up or down, independently of the sign on competitors’ 
profits.  
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 whether a merger is pro- or anticompetitive, the sign of the change in consumer surplus is all 
we need.   
 
Nevertheless, there are other situations where the identification of consumer surplus through 
competitors’ profits may break down.  The above framework focuses on unilateral effects in 
horizontal mergers.8  However, conglomerate mergers may lead to outcomes where the 
correspondence is lost.  In particular, if a merger between firms active in different markets 
leads to the marginalisation or foreclosure of competitors, thereby reducing their profit,  it 
may also hurt consumers.  For instance, consider a merger amongst firms selling 
complementary goods as a bundle (as in GE/Honeywell with avionics and engines). In this 
case, competitors will typically loose, even though consumers may gain or loose depending 
on particular features of demand.  Similarly tied sales of substitute or independent goods (as 
in Tetra Laval/Sidel with carton machines and PET machines) will typically hurt consumers 
but may increase or decrease competitors’ profits depending again on particular features of 
demand.  
 
In sum, we observe that the correspondence between the change in consumer surplus and 
competitors’ profits holds for a number of market games and merger effects, including those 
which are most widely used in the empirical literature on merger analysis, such as Bertrand 
Nash price setting.  However, there are exceptions, most notably when conglomerate effects 
are at work.  Given that conglomerate effect have played a role in several of the mergers 
evaluated by the European Commission in our sample, our empirical analysis needs to control 
for these cases (see below).   
 
We now turn to the second main issue, which is the reliability of stock market data in 
identifying the impact of a merger on competitors.   
 
There are several advantages to using stock market data.  As already discussed above, the 
stock market is an independent assessment of the effects of a merger. It is not done by insiders 
and as a result can be viewed as exogenous to the decision.  Second, stock market reactions 
are available whether the merger is allowed or not.  In particular, as we will see below, by 
using the stock market reactions on the day of the announcement, we identify the impact of a 
merger on competitors’ stocks even when the merger is blocked.  Stock market data thus 
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 avoid a potential censoring problem (i.e. the impact of a merger is only observed if the merger 
is cleared).  Another advantage of stock market data is that they are relatively easy to obtain, 
considering the alternative of getting measures of consumer surplus through the estimation of 
structural demand parameters.  Clearly structural estimation of demand in the context of a 
large number of cases may not be feasible.  Finally, relative to accounting data, stock market 
data are inherently prospective and hence better suited to capture dynamic effects of mergers 
on firm performance.  Using annual accounting profitability would require an explicit 
dynamic specification, the structure of which may not be easily tested.   
 
However, there are also potential drawbacks of stock market data that have been explored in 
the literature.  First, when participants in the stock market contemplate several possible 
mergers, the announcement of a particular merger will change the likelihood of many 
alternative configurations.9  As a consequence, a change in the stock price of a firm not 
involved in the merger may reflect more the change in the likelihood of alternative mergers 
involving that firm rather than the consequences of the announced merger for its profit.  First, 
the stock market reaction may reflect an "out of play" effect, if prior to the annoucement, the 
market anticipated an increase in the value of the “competitor” in alternative merger 
configurations which become irrelevant when the merger is announced (see Stennek and 
Fridolfsson, 2001).  In such instance, a fall in its stock price may not be a reliable indicator 
that the merger is pro-competitive (but an increase in its stock price will remain a good 
indicator that the merger is anti-competitive).  Second, the announcement of a merger may 
also induce an "in play" effects, such that it increases the likelihood that "competitors" will 
themselves be involved in subsequent mergers.  In this instance, an increase in the value of 
stock price of competitors may not be reliable indicator that the merger is anti-competitive.    
It is not clear however whether this later “in play” effect is important empirically; Salinger 
and Shuman (1988) test for the presence of such effects and conclude that it may matter in 
some cases, but it does not matter on average across a sample of cases.  Overall, it is thus 
difficult to predict the direction of  various potential "in and out of play" effects and it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 The correspondence would also hold with coordinated effects - which should increase the profits of competitors 
at the expense of consumers. 
9More generally, it should also be recognized that the market takes into account the antitrust procedure at the 
time of annoucement (see Aktas et al. (2003) for evidence on this).  Hence, the change in the value of the stock 
at the time of the announcement is equal to the probability that the deal will be cleared times the value that will 
accrue if it is realised. In order to identify whether deals are perceived as anti-competitive or not, we only use the 
sign of the expected change in the stock price. The expected change is of the same sign as the conditional change 
(i.e. given that the merger takes place), the former being a proportion of the latter. Hence, the fact that the market 
may anticipate the outcome of the antitrust procedure does not introduce a bias in our procedure.  However, the 
anticipated profits cannot be seen as exogenous.  This is further discussed below. 
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 unclear whether they matter.  We therefore do not consider the issue further in our empirical 
work, while recognizing that it may be a source of measurement error. 
 
Second, the quality of the information provided by event studies may be low.  Even though 
the method is widely used,10 it has also been subject to criticism (see, for instance, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).11  However, as confirmed by Schwert (1996), there is a lot of 
evidence in support of the semi-strong hypothesis of market efficiency with respect to 
mergers.  That is, the change in stock prices is likely to provide an unbiased estimate of the 
change in profit, even though that estimate may not be very precise. Whether the precision is 
high can also be assessed in terms of predictive power.  A number of studies have tried to 
compare ex ante previsions through event studies with ex post realizations.  One should be 
cautious in interpreting the results of ex post studies (which face their own methodological 
problems), but the results are nonetheless instructive.12  Using different samples of mergers, 
Ravenscraft and Pascoe (1989), Healy et al. (1992), as well as Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) 
all found that the ex ante stock market returns are positively and significantly correlated with 
ex post performance.  Moreover, Sirower and O' Byrne (1998) find that ex post outcomes (in 
terms of economic value added – i.e. profit less a normal charge for capital) match the ex ante 
stock market prediction in 66% of the cases and explain 46% of the variation in the market.  
Overall, these studies show that the market predicts actual outcomes with some accuracy.  
 
Besides the issue of consistency and efficiency of the stock market's anticipation of the 
consequences of mergers, the question also arises whether the information provided by the 
stock market is significant.   Existing studies typically report that the annoucement of mergers 
triggers relative large changes in stock market prices.   This is confirmed by the recent study 
of Aktas et al. (2003) who consider the reaction to the stock market price of merging firms for 
a large sample of cases reviewed by the EU (which largely overlaps with our sample).  The 
significance of the market reaction can be illustrated by looking at the absolute value of 
comparing the change in stock prices on the day of announcement with the absolute value of 
                                                 
10 See for instance Pautler (2001) for a survey.  If event studies are no longer used by US antitrust authorities in 
order to evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of particular mergers under review (as they were at one 
point in time), they have remained quite popular as a source of information to be used in cross-section studies 
(see for instance, Banerjee and Eckart, 1998).  Given the variance that surrounds the estimates of the merger 
effects in event studies, it would indeed seem appropriate to avoid attaching too much significance to particular 
observations but rather use them as observations subject to measurement errors in the context of cross section 
studies.   
11 Event studies are typically less reliable when the merger affects a small part of the firm being quoted.   
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 the change of an appropriate stock market index on the same day.  Indeed, on would expect 
merger to trigger large change relative to those induced by the news that moves the index (on 
average).  Figure 2 provides some descriptive evidence on this:  for each of the 164 merger 
case in our sample, we have calculated the abnormal return on the day of annoucement for 
both merging firms and competitors (using an appopriate index as an benchmark).13  Figure 2 
then report the absolute value of the abnormal return as proportion of the (percentage) change 
in the index.  The average abnormal return relative to an index for the entire population of 
firms in our sample is about 40, which implies that the merger effect on firms’ stocks is about 
40 times larger than the change in the index.  However, there are outliers.  Considering only 
those firms for which the abnormal return relative to the index is smaller than 2 (this is about 
89% of our population of firms), the average drops to about .95.  Figure 2 plots the 
distribution of these proportional abnormal returns for the firms where it is less than 2.   
 
Figure 2.  Abnormal returns relative to the index 
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As can be seen, the average abnormal return as a proportion of the change in the index is 
around 1, indicating that the abnormal return is itself is as large as the index.  Overall, we 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 One should also note that these studies only consider merging firms.  The reliability of the ex ante reaction to 
the stock market price of competitors has not, to the best of our knowledge, been investigated. 
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 conclude that the merger announcements do have a sizable impact on firms’ stock market 
prices.   
 
3.  A Simple Empirical Framework 
As discussed above, we proceed by using the change in competitors’ profit as an indicator of 
the competitive consequences of the merger.  For the time being, let us assume that the 
antitrust agency is meant to clear or prohibit mergers depending on its consequences on 
competition and hence consumer surplus (we will return to this assumption later).  As a result, 
we are able to identify the mergers for which the actual decision of the agency is different 
from what it should have been according to the anticipation of the stock market.  Furthermore, 
we can investigate the circumstances that will make such mistakes more or less likely.   
 
3.1 Empirical Specification 
 
According to the above set-up, a benevolent agency blocks a merger if and only if consumer 
surplus is reduced.  Define a decision dummy for the benevolent agency, D, we have the 
following decision rule, 
 

=
 (block)     0
clear) (       1
D
otherwise
if
   
0>CS  
 
Let P be the actual decision taken by the agency, which is equal to 1 when the merger is 
cleared, and zero otherwise.14  To characterize these decisions, it is useful to refer to type I 
and type II errors: a type I error occurs when the agency blocks a merger that should have 
been cleared, while a type II error occurs when the agency clears a merger that should have 
been blocked.  Assuming that P and D are observable to the econometrician (we will return to 
this later), type I and II errors are given by, 
 
 1  and  0 iff   11 === DPE   (Type I error) 
          [1] 
 0  and  1 iff   12 === DPE   (Type II error) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 The variable that we build is: , where  is the percentage change in the 
stock price of firm i at time t and  is the percentage change in the corresponding index.  
( ) ( )
( )it itit it
R I
x
I
∆ − ∆= ∆ itR∆
itI∆
14 Remedies (or undertakings) will be discussed below. 
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 What are the potential factors that influence the occurrences of type I and II errors.  Following 
the theoretical analysis in Neven and Röller (2002), we suppose that an antitrust agency 
maximizes its own utility and that third parties (including firms as well as other agents like 
member states’ governments) can affect its utility (for instance by providing contingent 
perks).  In this context, to the extent that the agency is not perfectly monitored by its 
principal, it may pursue its own objective at the expense of those that it has been assigned.  
Clearly, the monitoring environment (which includes accountability to the ultimate principals 
but also media attention) play an important role in the relative “costs” of making either errors 
of type I or II.  
 
Let us first consider the influence that firms can bring to bear on the agency.  There are two 
cases of interest.  First, assume that a merger is anti-competitive, that is D=0. In this case, 
competitors’ profits rise with a merger ( ), competitors and the merging firms’ 
incentives are aligned, and all firms are in favor of getting the merger approved.  In particular, 
when a benevolent agency wants to block the merger, all firms have an incentive to influence 
the agency to have the merger cleared.  If they are successful, a type II error occurs.  The 
second possibility arises when a merger is pro-competitive, that is D=1.  Note that in this case 
the incentives of the firms are not aligned, since competitors’ profits fall with the merger 
( ).  In this situation the relative influence of the two sides is important.  If the 
competitors have enough influence with the agency then the merger is blocked, and a type I 
error occurs. Alternatively, if the merging firms have more influence, then pro-competitive 
mergers are always cleared and no error occurs.   
0>Π c
0<Π c
 
Besides firms, there are also a number of institutional and political economy variables that 
may influence the anti-trust agency.  For instance, it has been suggested (see Neven et al., 
1994) that the size of the country in which the merging firms originate does play a role in the 
final outcome of a merger investigation presumably because of the political pressure that can 
be exercised by large countries15.  
 
Another important issue is market definition.  It is often asserted (see for instance, Neven et 
al. 1994) that the EU merger guidelines are biased towards excessively narrow market 
definitions, both in terms of the wording of the guidelines and in actual practice.  As a result, 
narrow market definition may thus be associated with a higher frequency of errors.   
                                                 
15 See also, for instance, Horn and Stennek, 2001, with regard to Nordic countries.  
 13 
 There are also procedural issues that potentially have an impact on errors.  Most importantly, 
the time available to undertake the analysis may be relevant so that errors may be affected by 
whether the case has been decided in phase I or has been subject to a more substantial 
investigation (phase II).   Finally, the pattern of errors may vary across the sectors in which 
the mergers are taking place, as some industrial sectors have more political cloud than others, 
mostly as the level of member states.   
 
The previous discussion suggests the following political economy specification of type I and 
type II errors in merger control, 
 
101 εαααα ++Π−Π−= XE xmmcc   for D=1  [2] 
           
202 εββββ ++Π+Π+= XE xmmcc   for D=0  [3] 
 
where E1 and E2 are defined in [1],  and  are changes in profits due to the merger to the 
merging firms and the competitors, respectively.
mΠ cΠ
16  Note that [2] specifies type I errors 
conditional on a merger being pro-competitive (D=1) as E1 can only occur when D=1.  
Similarly, [3] specifies type II errors conditional on a merger being anti-competitive (D=0), 
since E2 can only occur when D=0.   
 
Note that we expect α , since the impact of the competitors profits on type I errors is 
negative, i.e. the more negative Π  the more competitors are against the merger and the 
higher the likelihood of a type I error.  Also, we would expect that α , since merging 
firms have an incentive to lobby against type I errors.  Finally, we expect that  and 
, as all firms would like to induce a type II errors. 
0>c
c
0>m
0>mβ
0>cβ
 
In light with the above discussion, specification [2] and [3] includes several other important 
institutional and political economy variables (X) that may influence the anti-trust agency such 
as country and industry effects, market definition, as well as procedural issues.   We will 
return to these variables in more details below. 
 
                                                 
16 Note the change in the profit of merging firms, as estimated from stock market data, is often negative.  In the 
context of the estimation of (2)-(3), this however only involves a scaling issue.  There are up to 14 competitors 
identified in our sample (see Section 4).  We have aggregated the returns of the competitors into a single 
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 3.2  Hypothesis 
 
Assuming that we can measure the variables and estimate [2] and [3] consistently (see the 
next section), we then test the following hypotheses about the decision process.  We begin by 
specifying a test for benevolence (up to white noise). 
H1 (Benevolence): α , no systematic errors of type I or II.  0'' == ss β
 
That is the decision process produces errors that can be characterized by white noise through 
the error terms of . As can be seen from the definition of E1 and E2 this is likely to be 
the case whenever P and D are similar.  
),( 21 εε
 
The next hypothesis tests for systematic influence on the agency, which is consistent with the 
theoretical model discussed above.  
 
H2 (Influence) 
0,0,0 ≠>> xmc ααα  type I  
0,0,0 ≠>> xmc βββ  type II  
 
The following hypothesis tests whether the agency is more susceptible to influence activities 
by merging firms or by competitors.  
H3 (“listen to competitors more ”) 
mc αα >  => competitors matter more in type I scenarios  
mc ββ >  => competitors matter more in type II scenarios 
 
H3 tests the claim that has been alleged by various parties (see for instance James, 2001) that 
the EU Commission does listen more to competitors than to other firms.  
 
The final hypothesis centers around possible systematic biases away from what a benevolent 
agency might do.  
 
H4 (“systematic biases”)   0,0 00 ≠≠ βα
                                                                                                                                                        
measure.  As expected the individual firms’ returns are often – but not always – of the same sign.  In particular, 
the sign of individual firms’ returns are the same as the aggregate return in about two-thirds of all the cases. 
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 Recall that benevolence is defined as following a consumer surplus standard.  This 
assumption is worth discussing, with particular reference to the European context.  The 
European Commissions’ Merger Regulation (ECMR) is concerned with the creation or 
reinforcement of a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded (Art 2.3).  The regulation also indicates that efficiencies can be taken 
into account in the analysis as long as consumers are not hurt (Art 2.1b).  Altogether, the 
objective set by the ECMR would thus appear to involve the protection of consumer welfare.  
Two difficulties arise, however, with this interpretation.   The first difficulty arises from the 
concept of dominance, which is not closely associated with the prospect for price increases, 
which hurt consumers.  If anything, it would appear that significant price increases can take 
place, even if dominance is not created or strengthened.  There has been increasing 
recognition of this in the context of the debate surrounding the Green paper on the reform of 
the ECMR (see Vickers (2002) for a succinct view on this).  This arises because firms with 
moderate market share may still be able to achieve significant price increases if they sell close 
substitutes.  Accordingly, the excessively narrow scope of the concept of dominance may 
induce systematic type II errors (but no systematic type I error).  
 
The second difficulty arises from the consideration of efficiencies.  As emphasized by Farrell 
and Shapiro (2001), any antitrust authority which (like the EU) only considers efficiency (if at 
all) in the presence of significant anti-competitive concerns17 must assume a benchmark level 
of efficiency across all cases (and clear cases where minor anti-competitive concerns arise on 
the assumption that they will be compensated by efficiencies).  Still, the absence of a 
systematic evaluation of efficiencies in each case could involve a bias in the Commission’s 
decisions; if the benchmark level of efficiency, which is assumed by the Commission, 
exceeds average efficiency gains, mergers which hurt consumers could be allowed by the 
Commission.  The opposite, however, is not true because the Commission’s approach is 
asymmetric,18 if the Commission finds that there is a competitive concern and that the 
                                                 
17 This interpretation is consistent with the wording of the regulation and the apparent practice of the 
Commission.  It is also consistent with some of the rare references to efficiency that one finds in actual 
decisions.  For instance, in Aérospatiale-Alénia/De Havilland (a prohibition), the Commission acknowledged 
that it had considered efficiencies but that efficiencies were not sufficient to overturn the presumption that the 
merger was anti-competitive.  Some observers however doubt that the Commission pays more than lip service to 
efficiency claims put forward by the parties (see Röller et al, 2001 for instance).   The fact that the Commission 
may have turned efficiency into an offence in some cases should also induce some reluctance on the part of 
merging parties in claiming efficiencies.  This may further contribute to an effective neglect of efficiency 
considerations.     
18 If one assumes (see previous footnote) that the Commission hardly ever consider efficiencies, then both types 
of discrepancies could arise.  Mergers that benefit consumers could be prohibited.  
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 benchmark level of efficiency is insufficient to ensure that prices will not increase, it will 
investigate actual efficiencies.  Assuming that its evaluation is not biased, it will on average 
find the actual level of efficiency and hence will not prevent mergers which exhibit sufficient 
efficiency to ensure that prices do not increase.  Hence, the Commission’s approach to 
efficiency could lead to systematic type II errors but not to systematic type I errors. 
Overall, it appears that both the dominance criteria and the treatment of efficiencies could 
lead to systematic type II errors.  In the context of our empirical investigation a finding that 
 could thus be associated with these factors.  ,00 >α
 
3.3  Further Measurement Issues 
In order to estimate specification [2] and [3] we need to measure E1 and E2.  Since the actual 
decision P is observable, measurement of E1 and E2 is equivalent to measuring D.  Since D 
requires an estimate of the impact on consumer surplus, we define D=1 (CS>0) iff .   0<Π c
 
As discussed above, there are circumstances (conglomerate effects) where a merger could 
have a negative impact on both CS and .  In other words, while a positive Π  would always 
imply an anti-competitive merger, a negative Π  could be either pro- or anti-competitive.  As 
a result, there may be cases where D is set to zero, even though it should be one.  Given the 
definition of E1 and E2, this implies that there are cases wrongly classified as a type I error, 
as well as cases which are wrongly classified as no type II error.  We will return to this point 
below. 
cΠ c
c
 
A second measurement issue relates to the observability of the change in profit associated 
with the merger, that is .  Recall that we need (  to define D, as well as for 
estimation of [2] and [3].  However, we only observe  when P=1, i.e. when the 
merger actually takes place.  Moreover, we also need to know what  would have 
been, when a merger is blocked.  This is a censoring problem
),( mc ΠΠ ), mc ΠΠ
),( mc ΠΠ
),( mc ΠΠ
19.   
 
As discussed above, we solve this problem by using stock market reaction data.  In particular, 
consider the change in the stock price around the date of announcement (see the data section 
for details). Let V  be the abnormal change in the value of the merging firms on the day of m
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 the announcement of the merger.  Similarly, let V  be the abnormal change in the value of 
the competitors' stock on the day of the announcement of the merger.  Moreover, let p be the 
probability that the market assigns to the event that the merger is cleared by the antitrust 
agency.  From this it follows that V  and V .  Note that V  and  have 
the same sign (since  must be non-negative), which allows us to define D=1 iff .  
Moreover, a measure of the change in firm profitability are given by  and 
.  Since V  and  are observable in the stock market, we are left with the need 
to obtain a consistent estimate of p, which is the probability that the market expects that the 
merger is cleared by the antitrust agency.  We therefore estimate p by a reduced form probit 
on the full sample using all the instruments in Table 3.  Having estimated p, we are able to get 
measures for  and .  
c
m mp= Π
ˆ/m mV pΠ =
                                                                                                                               
c p= Πc
p
c
Π =
cΠ
R
/c
                         
p
m
ˆ/cV
0<c
pc V
/m mVΠ = cR
ˆˆ
c pΠ =
 
4.  Descriptive Results 
 
Our sample includes all phase II mergers completed by the EU until the end of 2001, and a 
randomly matched sample of phase I cases, which run through the June 2002.  A list of all 
cases and the decision dates are provided in Appendix 3. For each case, we have identified 
merging firms and competitors from the decision, as well as the date of the announcement 
from the financial press.  For each firm (merging firm or competitor), we have computed the 
abnormal return20 on the day of announcement as well as the abnormal change in the value of 
equity. We add the change in the value of equity across merging partners to obtain an 
aggregate measure of the value of merging firms. When several competitors are identified in 
the decision (as is often the case, in particular when several relevant markets are considered), 
we have added the change in the value of equity across firms to obtain the aggregate effects 
on competitors. Because of difficulties in identifying competitors or their stock, we end up 
with 73 phase II cases and 91 phase I cases for which we have complete information.  
 
Table 1 reports the number of cases in our sample according to the decisions taken by the 
Commission and according to the stock market evaluation of their competitive consequences. 
We observe that 51 % of all cases are classified as pro-competitive.  This implies that the 
19 One solution may be to estimate a simultaneous switching regression model, where P and the firm profitability 
are estimated. Given the available data this is not a feasible estimation strategy.  
20 See Appendix 2 for details on the construction of the variables. 
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 distribution of efficiency gains across mergers has a median roughly equal to the level of 
efficiency that would ensure that consumers are benefiting (e' in Figure 1).  This observation 
should be contrasted with the usual finding of event studies such that a majority of mergers 
fail to generate value for the shareholders of acquirers (even though the variance is large and 
some mergers generate very high returns), such that target shareholders obtain handsome 
premia and acquirers and target shareholders combined earn small but positive returns on 
average (see Pautler, 2002, for a survey).  Leaving aside the issue of the allocation of the 
value being generated across merging firms (acquirer and target) and the puzzle that many 
mergers are not expected to generate value ex ante for acquirers, these observations suggest 
that the average level of efficiency is fairly low.  Hence, it would appear that the average21 
level of efficiency, as inferred from the stock market reaction of competitors is significantly 
larger than the average level of efficiency, which can be inferred from the stock market 
reaction of merging firms.22 This observation is a bit of a puzzle. One possible interpretation is 
that mergers do generate significant efficiencies, which affect competitors, but that the 
shareholders of the merging firms do not manage to obtain the rents associated with these 
efficiencies (possibly in part because of ineffective corporate control).23 If this interpretation is 
correct, it would suggest that the common presumption that efficiencies associated with 
mergers tend to be small, which relies on evidence of gains to merging firms, could be 
misplaced. Gains may have been underestimated. 
 
Table 1 distinguishes between different types of decisions depending on the article of the 
Merger Regulation that was applied.   Unconditional clearance are associated with Article 
6.1.b decisions in phase I, as long as they do not involve conditions, and with Article 8.1 
decisions in Phase II.  Similarly, prohibitions are associated with Article 8.3 decisions (only 
in Phase II).  The issue then arises of how to consider decisions which involve remedies 
known in EU jargon as undertakings, either in Phase (Article 6.1b decisions with conditions) 
or in phase II (Article 8.2 decisions).   Whether a decision with undertaking can be seen as 
giving rise to an error, namely a type I error in a pro-competitive case and a type II error in a 
anti-competitive case, depends on whether  the stock market anticipate remedies, and whether 
the remedies work to the benefit of the consumer.  In our empirical analysis below, we 
                                                 
21 Assuming that the average is close to the median. 
22 The usual finding with respect to the creation of value for merging firms is broadly confirmed in our sample. 
We find 79 cases (out of 164) in which the merger creates value for the merging firms.  
23 This interpretation would also be consistent with the observation from ex post studies that most mergers do not 
generate additional profits relative a control group, as long as the rents appropriated by management are recorded 
as additional costs and hence reduce reported profits.  
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 assume that the stock market cannot anticipate the remedies24.   We will also assume that the 
remedies meet the competitive concerns, in cases that are otherwise anti-competitive.  These 
assumptions first  imply that case which are considered as anti-competitive by the stock 
market and include remedies will not involve type II errors.   From this perspective, our 
assumptions are thus conservative as they lead to fewer type II errors.   We therefore define 
type II errors solely as cases considered as anti-competitive by the stock market which are 
cleared without conditions (bottom row of Table 1).  Second, under our assumptions, 
remedies are not necessary in those mergers that the stock market anticipates as pro-
competitive (top of Table 1).  Hence,  Article 8.2 decisions and Article 6.1.b decisions with 
remedies then involve unwarranted restrictions on pro-competitive deals.   We classify those 
cases as "weak type I" errors.  Overall, strong type I errors thus involve prohibitions of 
mergers that the market deems to be pro-competitive.  Weak type I errors involve  strong type 
I errors as well as cases considered to be pro-competitive which involve remedies.  Our 
econometric analysis will be performed with respect to weak type I errors. 25   
 
Table 1 indicates the frequency of type I and II errors. Given that a merger is anti-competitive, 
Table 1 shows that 34 cases (out of 80) are type II errors, some 42%. This implies that 42% of 
all anti-competitive mergers are cleared.  On the other hand, given that a merger is pro-
competitive, only 4.75% (4 out of 84) of the cases are blocked and involve strong type I 
errors.  However,  weak type I error are observed in  47 out of 84 cases, or some 56%.   
 
Interestingly, our data identify as strong type I errors two cases that have later been 
overturned on appeal (namely Airtours/First Choice and Tetra Laval/Sidel) and one case 
(General Electric /Honeywell) that has been highly controversial and is being appealed.  As 
we mentioned above, however, our approach does not take conglomerate effects into account.  
Assuming that no type I error was made in those cases where conglomerate effects play an 
important role, then both Tetra Laval/Sidel and General Electric /Honeywell are no mistakes, 
reducing the number of type I errors to 2 out of 84 pro-competitive cases.   
 
                                                 
24 Given that remedies are the outcome of a negotiation between the Commission and the parties, it appears 
difficult to form a prior.  Note, however, that if the market does anticipate remedies, the definition of our 
dependent variables in [2] and [3] are affected.  In this case, any instance where the market anticipates that the 
merger would be anti-competitive would be associated with a type II error. But of course, any instance where the 
market anticipates that the merger would be pro-competitive and is cleared with remedies would not be 
associated with a type I error. 
25 Note that there are only 4 strong type I errors.  An econometric analysis using this alternative definition would 
be rather uninformative. 
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 Conditioning our frequencies on the decision, our data find that the number of  strong type I 
errors as a proportion of the total number of prohibition is 4 of the 14 (some 28%)26.  Looking 
at type II errors, as a percentage of all mergers that were cleared, our data suggest that the 
Commission made an error in about 23 % of the cases (or 51% if we include the weak type II 
definition).  This implies that both type I and II errors occur with similar probabilities: 
roughly one in four mergers that are cleared (or blocked).   
 
5.  Econometric Results 
 
Estimation of equations [2] and [3] proceeds by splitting the sample into anti- and pro-
competitive sub-samples, as defined by the dummy variable D.  In particular, we estimate [2] 
as a probit model on the sample of pro-competitive deals.  Moreover, we use the weak 
definition of type I errors, that is we set E1=1 when a pro-competitive merger is blocked or 
there are remedies. Similarly, equation [3] is estimated on the sample of anti-competitive 
deals.27   
 
The explanatory variables that are available for each merger case are described in Table 3 
with summary statistics provided in Table 2.  As can be seen in Table 3, MGAINS denotes 
the expected change in the profit of the merging firms as measured through the abnormal 
return the day of the announcements, while CGAINS is the expected change in the profits of 
competitors.   
 
There are also a number of other important variables that may explain EU decisions (see 
Table 2 and 3 again).  To characterize market definition we include a dummy called 
NATIONAL, which is equal to 1 if the relevant geographic market is national, as well as a 
dummy EU, which is equal to 1 when the relevant geographic market is the EU.  We also 
include country and industry effects. BIG_EU is a dummy that takes the value 1 if at least one 
of the merging company has its headquarter and main operation in one of the large EU 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK).  In terms of industries, we include 
dummies for NACE codes corresponding to “manufacturing”, “transport, storage, and 
                                                 
26 Exclusing those cases where conglomerate effects were crucial, we get 2 out of 12 (some 17%). 
27 Alternatively, one can estimate equation [2] and [3] jointly – possibly allowing for correlation across 
equations- as a bivariate probit with sample selection, due to the definition of D.  
 21 
 communication”, as well as “financial intermediation”.28  Finally, we introduce some 
variables that relate to procedure: a dummy variable (PHASE1) is 1 when a decisions is taken 
in phase I, as well as a linear time trend (T). 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.  Considering weak type I estimation results first, it can 
be seen in Table 4, that the Chi-squared statistic is 23.4929, which indicates that α  with 
over 99% probability.  In other words, the decisions by the commission are not consistent 
with what a benevolent agency (making random errors) would have done.  We therefore reject 
H1 (benevolence).  
0' ≠s
 
Regarding the specific determinants, Table 4 shows that there is no evidence for hypothesis 
H2 in our data.  That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms’ have no influence over the 
agency as far as weak type I errors are concerned.  This is true for both competitors and 
merging firms.  It appears that influence is not associated with firms’ rents.  
 
While market definition is not statistically significant in terms of weak type I errors, 
procedural factors are important. The PHASE I variable indicates that the probability that a 
weak type I error occurs in phase II is more likely (p-value of 0.002).  Table 5 reports the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables.  As can be seen the marginal impact of phase I 
is estimated at -0.411, which implies that the probability of a weak type I error is about 41% 
higher in phase II.   
 
In terms of country and industry effects, the evidence is as follows.  The effect of the 
BIG_EU variable is statistically significant at an 11% level.  In terms of magnitude, the 
estimates suggest that the bigger EU countries have a 21% lower chance of getting a pro-
competitive deal curtailed (see Table 5).  We also have industry effects.  In particular, 
“transport, storage, and communication” industry has a significantly higher likelihood of 
getting a pro-competitive deal curtailed (p-value of 0.051).  
 
                                                 
28 We experimented with dummies for all NACE codes present in our sample.   Other industry dummies that 
those reported here never proved significant (and their inclusion does not change the results).   We use the 
NACE codes reported in the decisions. 
29 The Chi-squared statistic for testing H0: β=0 (not including the constant) and the significance level equals the 
probability that the χ2 exceeds the test value calculated as χ2=2(lnL-lnL0), where L is the log-likelihood of the 
estimated model and  L0 is the log-likelihood of the model estimate with the constant only. 
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 The estimates in Table 4 further indicate that there is a systematic bias (hypothesis H4) as the 
constant in [2] is highly significant (p-value of 0.025).  In other words, there is a persistent 
effect in favor of imposing unnecessary remedies or blocking pro-competitive mergers.  In 
fact, the marginal impact is 0.52 (see Table 5), suggesting that other things being equal the 
probability of making this kind of error is 53%.  This is indeed a large and significant effect.  
However, as indicated above, our method might wrongly classify mergers as pro-competitive 
in the presence of conglomerate effects.   
 
In order to test whether the large and significant bias that we find in favor of curtailing 
seemingly pro-competitive mergers may not be associated with the presence of conglomerate 
mergers that we wrongly classified as pro-competitive, we identify those cases where the 
Commission has mentioned conglomerate effects as one of their leading arguments in support 
if the final decision.  We then re-estimate [2] while assuming that those mergers do not 
involve an error (i.e. by setting E1=0 for those cases where conglomerate effects play an 
important role such as in Tetra Laval/Sidel and General Electric /Honeywell).  The resulting 
estimates are also in Table 4.  As can be seen, most of the parameter estimates do not 
change30.  In particular, the Chi-squared statistic is still 18.60. In other words, if we assume 
that mergers in which the Commission has identified conglomerate effects do not involve an 
error, we still cannot reject that the hypothesis that the Commission makes systematic errors 
in imposing unnecessary remedies or blocking pro-competitive mergers.31   
 
Turning to the analysis of type II errors, we again find evidence that the decisions by the 
commission are not consistent with those that would have been taken by a benevolent agency 
making random errors (the Chi-squared statistic is 41.65). As far as hypothesis H1 is 
concerned we reject benevolence with over 99% probability.  Moreover, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that firms have no influence over the agency as far as type II errors are concerned 
(hypothesis H2).  As for the weak type I analysis, neither the merging firms nor the 
competitors are significantly related to type II errors.  Interestingly, there is only weak 
evidence of a systematic bias (hypothesis H4) in type II errors, suggesting that dominance and 
the treatment of efficiency may not induce a systematic deviation away from the protection of 
consumers.   
                                                 
30 The BIG_EU and the Phase I effects become smaller. Interestingly, the time trend becomes significant and the 
sign indicates that the likelihood of type I errors decreases over time. 
31 If instead of assuming that conglomerate mergers do not involve errors, we simply remove these cases from 
the sample, we obtain similar conclusions. 
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 There are several other variables that characterize the merger process that are significant in 
explaining type II errors.  Amongst those variables is the market definition that is used in a 
given merger.  As can be seen in Table 4, a market definition that is national (as opposed to 
EU or World) significantly lowers the probability of an anti-competitive merger being 
cleared.  Moreover, the marginal impact of a market definition that is national is estimated at 
some –0.60, which implies that an anti-competitive merger that was subject to a national 
market definition has a 60% lower chance of being cleared (see Table 5).   The observation 
that the Commission is more likely to identify anti-competitive effects when market definition 
is national is consistent with the view that its geographic market definition is unduly narrow; 
indeed, in the presence of a such a bias, anti-competitive effects for mergers that were 
marginal in terms of market definition but evaluated at the national level will be 
overestimated relative to the anti-competitive that are found in broader markets.  This will 
lead to a higher probability of finding anti-competitive in national markets (as observed in our 
data).   
 
Country of origin effects are also statistically significant.  If a merger involves a least one 
firm that is located in one of the four big EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
UK) an anti-competitive merger is more likely to make it through regulatory approval (p-
value of 0.09, see Table 4).  Moreover, the marginal impact of BIG_EU according to our data 
is rather large (see Table 5), with the probability increased by some 26%.   
 
Besides country effects, the findings in Table 4 indicate that industry effects play a major 
role.  In particular, the “manufacturing” and the “financial intermediation” industries show 
statistically significantly lower levels of type II errors (p-values of 0.006 and 0.045, 
respectively).  This suggests that the likelihood of getting an anti-competitive merger cleared 
is some 48% lower whenever a merger is in the manufacturing sector (see Table 5).  
 
There are also significant factors relating to process. A variable that turns out to be very 
significant and large in magnitude is PHASE1, i.e. whether a merger is decided in phase 1 or 
phase 2.  As expected, the estimates in Table 4 confirm that significantly more type II errors 
are made in phase 1.  Table 5 indicates that the probability of waving an anti-competitive 
merger through is some 72% larger in phase 1.  This is indeed a very high price to pay for a 
fast decision.  Given the limited resources available at the Commission and the increased 
number of notifications, it is thus hardly surprising the number of type II errors has increased.  
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 This observation is further explained by the significance of the time trend T (see Table 4), 
which may just represent an increased workload coupled with a relatively higher proportion 
of cases necessarily being decided in phase I.  The recent reform plans discussed in the so-
called Green Paper envisages an increase in the effective length of phase II.  Our results 
suggest that extending the time and resources allocated to phase I, or alternatively opening 
phase II investigations more frequently, would be desirable. 
 
In sum, we find some evidence that the decisions by the Commission are not in line with a 
benevolent agency would have done.  However, we find no evidence in support of the  claim 
that the commission is influenced by firms, either the merging firms or by competitors.  
Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors – such as country and industry effects, as well 
as procedural aspects – do play a role. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions.  
We consider a sample of some 164 mergers that have been reviewed by the EU and collect 
evidence on whether the stock market anticipated that these mergers were anti-competitive.   
From this, we identify instances where the EU has prohibited mergers that the stock market 
regarded as pro-competitive (strong type I errors) as well as instances where the EU has 
imposed remedies on seemingly pro-competitive deals (weak type I errors) and instances 
where the EU has failed to prevent mergers that were regarded as anti-competitive (type II 
errors).  We further investigate the source of these errors and in particular focus on the 
potential influences that can be brought to bear on the decision making process.   
 
In terms of descriptive results our data suggest that the Commission made a strong type I error 
in 4 of the 14 prohibitions (some 28%).  Interestingly, our method has identified as type I 
errors two cases that have later been overturned on appeal (namely Airtours/First Choice and 
Tetra Laval/Sidel) and one case (General Electric /Honeywell) that has been highly 
controversial and is being appealed.32  Regarding type II errors, we find that the Commission 
made an error in about 23 % of the cases that is has cleared without remedies (assuming that 
the market did not anticipate remedies – our preferred hypothesis).   
 
                                                 
32 As discussed above, the evidence regarding Airtours/First Choice is more telling as the other two cases 
involved conglomerate effects.  
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 We further provide econometric evidence regarding the determinants of weak type I and type 
II errors.  Our results suggest that the commission’s decisions are not purely explained by the 
motive of protecting consumer surplus.  In other words, the institutional and political 
environment does matter.  As far as firms’ influence is concerned, however, our data suggests 
that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive to firms’ interests.  In particular, there is no 
support in our data for the claim that “the Commission listens too much to competitors, at the 
expense of consumer interests”.  Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors – such as 
country and industry effects, as well as market definition – do play a role. 
 
Our analysis also finds that procedural aspects are important.  One possible explanation 
consistent with our data is that the workload has increased over time, which results in more 
cases being decided in phase I.  The probability of waving an anti-competitive merger through 
is some 72% higher, which is a high price to pay.  This suggests that allocating more time and 
resources to phase I, as well as opening phase II more frequently, may reduce type II errors 
considerably. 
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 Table 1. Decisions and Competitors’ Gains 
 
 PHASE I PHASE II  
 6.1.b 6.1.b with 
remedies 
8.1. 8.2.  8.3.  
Negative Gains 
(pro competitive) 
28 20 9 23 4 
 
84 
Positive Gains 
(anti competitive) 
27 16 7 20 10 80 
 55 36 16 43 14 164 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
BLOCK 164 0.0854 0.2803 
CLEAR 164 0.4329 0.4970 
REMEDIES 164 0.4817 0.5012 
PHASE1 164 0.5549 0.4985 
PHASE2 164 0.4451 0.4985 
PROCOMP 164 0.5122 0.5014 
ANTICOMP 164 0.4878 0.5014 
WTYPE I 84 0.2142 0.4994 
STYPE I 84 0.0476 0.5595 
TYPE II 80 0.4350 0.4975 
CGAINS2 164 1.2212 35.9017 
MGAINS2 164 -0.2525 13.3765 
BIG_EU 164 0.6524 0.4777 
SMALL_EU 164 0.1951 0.3819 
NATIONAL 164 0.3293 0.4714 
EU 164 0.4207 0.4952 
D 164 0.6585 0.4757 
I 164 0.1159 0.3210 
J 164 0.0549 0.2284 
WORLD 164 0.2195 0.4152 
T  164 82.5000 47.4868 
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 Table 3. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Decisions  
BLOCK Dummy = 1 if the merger was blocked (Art. 8.3) 
CLEAR Dummy = 1 if the merger was cleared without remedies (Art. 6.1b or Art. 8.2.) 
REMEDIES 
 
Dummy = 1 if the merger was cleared with remedies (Art. 6.1b with remedies or Art. 8.2 
with remedies) 
PHASE1 Dummy = 1 if the merger was in phase I 
PHASE2 Dummy = 1 if the merger was in phase II 
Gains from merger  
CGAINS ( ) cΠ
 
 
 
Gains from mergers for the competitors a. Cumulative change in stock market value 
(relative to an index) for the competitors on the day around the first announcement date 
of the merger in the international press. The value is expressed in million 1995 constant 
Euro. 
MGAINS ( ) mΠ
 
 
 
Gains from mergers for the merging parties. Cumulative change in stock market value 
(relative to an index) for the merging parties on the day around the first announcement 
date of the merger in the international press. The value is expressed in million 1995 
constant Euro.   
Competitiveness Assessment 
PROCOMP Dummy = 1 if the merger was pro-competitive (CGAINS < 0) 
ANTICOMP Dummy = 1 if the merger was anti-competitive (CGAINS > 0) 
Commission’s errors 
STYPE1 
 
 
Dummy = 1 if the commission made a type I error, i.e. a pro-competitive merger was 
blocked. We assume that also remedies should be considered an error, since these are 
pro-competitive mergers which should be allowed. 
WTYPE1 Dummy = 1 if the commission blocks or impose remedies on a pro-competitive merger  
TYPE2 
 
 
Dummy = 1 if the commission made a type II error, i.e. a anti-competitive merger was 
cleared with remedies. The assumption is that the remedies restore competition but the 
market did not anticipate the use of remedies 
Geographic dummies 
BIG_EU 
 
Dummy = 1 if one of the merging part comes from one big EU country (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) 
SMALL_EU 
 
Dummy = 1 if one of the merging part comes from one small EU country (Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) 
Geographic and product market b 
NATIONAL Dummy = 1 if the relevant geographic market is national 
EU Dummy = 1 if the relevant geographic market is the EU 
WORLD Dummy = 1 if the relevant geographic market is the world 
D Dummy = 1 if the relevant product market is “manufacturing” 
I Dummy = 1 if the relevant product market is “transport, storage and communication” 
J Dummy = 1 if the relevant product market is “financial intermediation” 
Temporal variables 
T  Time trend 
a The competitors are those recognized as such in the Commission’s report. b  The product markets are defined 
according to the NACE codes. 
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 Table 4. Probit Estimation of Equation [2] and [3] 
 
WTYPE  1 Errors 
 
WTYPE  1 Errors 
Conglomerate Correction 
TYPE 2 Errors 
 
 Coeff.   P-Values Coeff.    P-Values Coeff. P-Values 
CONSTANT 1.3597 0.0255 1.0217 0.0826 -1.1395 0.1180 
CGAINS -0.0008 0.9169 0.0013 0.8592 -0.0441 0.2022 
MGAINS 0.0118 0.3595 0.0185 0.2813 0.0524 0.2841 
NATIONAL 0.1702 0.7073 0.1303 0.7628 -1.7158 0.0134 
EU -0.3397 0.4240 -0.0733 0.8601 -0.0387 0.9414 
BIG_EU -0.5370 0.1117 -0.2567 0.4321 0.7274 0.0980 
PHASE I -1.0483 0.0021 -0.5679 0.0852 2.0463 0.0000 
T -0.0053 0.1126 -0.0055 0.0961 0.0114 0.0216 
D 0.1797 0.5890 -0.3048 0.4034 -1.3859 0.0060 
I 1.5025 0.0509 1.2915 0.0810 0.3278 0.6617 
J -0.5079 0.5209 -0.7975 0.3216 -1.8303 0.0449 
Observations 84 84 80 
Log Likelihood -45.88187      -48.83071      -33.72439      
Chi-squared 23.49168      18.59676      41.64796      
Significance level 0.0091 0.0457 0.0000 
Correct Predictions  72.62 % 66.67 % 77.50% 
The estimation of Type I errors is on the sub-sample of pro-competitive mergers, while the estimation of Type II 
errors is on the sub-sample of anti-competitive mergers. The dependent variables are type1 and type2. The Gains 
Variables are corrected for p, the predicted probability of the case being cleared obtained by estimating a reduced 
form probit on the full sample, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the merger was not blocked and 
the exogenous variables are a constant, ANTICOMP, MGAINS, CGAINS, NATIONAL, EU, BIG_EU, D, I, J, T. 
 
Table 5 - Marginal Effects 
 
WTYPE  1 Errors 
 
WTYPE  1 Errors 
Correcting for conglomerate 
TYPE 2 Errors 
 
 Coeff.   P-Values Coeff.    P-Values Coeff. P-Values 
CONSTANT 0.5330 0.0237 0.4061 0.0837 -0.4025 0.1082 
CGAINS -0.0003 0.9169 0.0005 0.8592 -0.0156 0.1366 
MGAINS 0.0046 0.3601 0.0074 0.2798 0.0185 0.2912 
NATIONAL 0.0667 0.7073 0.0518 0.7627 -0.6061 0.0128 
EU -0.1332 0.4239 -0.0292 0.8601 -0.0137 0.9415 
BIG_EU -0.2105 0.1124 -0.1020 0.4319 0.2569 0.1010 
PHASE I -0.4109 0.0021 -0.2257 0.0849 0.7228 0.0000 
T -0.0021 0.1140 -0.0022 0.0957 0.0040 0.0194 
D 0.0704 0.5891 -0.1211 0.4030 -0.4895 0.0066 
I 0.5889 0.0496 0.5133 0.0819 0.1158 0.6565 
J  -0.1991 0.5214 -0.3169 0.3211 -0.6465 0.0509 
Partial derivatives of E[y] = F[*]   with respect to the vector of characteristics. They are computed at the means of 
the Xs. All sample observations used for computing the means (84 for type I errors and 80 for Type II errors). 
 
 32 
 Appendix 1 - The correspondence between consumer surplus and 
competitors’ profits 
 
For our definition of type I and II errors, we use the property that the sign of the CS is 
opposite of the sign of the competitors’ profits Π .  In other words, we need to show that the 
impact of the merger on CS and  is such that CS  if and only if Π .  As is shown by 
Farell and Shapiro 1990 (see also Vives 2000, page 101-102), Cournot games that satisfy 
some regularity conditions (such as uniqueness and stability) satisfy that CS  if and only if 
. 
c
cΠ 0> 0<c
0>
0<Π c
 
Consider now Bertrand competition with product differentiation.  Let the sum of the 
competitors’ profits be denoted by , where  is a price vector of competitors’ 
prices and  is a price vector of the merging firms.  Further let the products be substitutes 
such that Π  is increasing in . Assume that there are well-defined best-response 
functions, and that there is a unique and (locally) stable Nash equilibrium that depends 
smoothly on the efficiency e.  Let the pre-merger equilibrium be denoted by ( ). Note 
that the merger will have two effects: a change in efficiency (e) and a collusive price setting 
amongst the merging firms (m).  
),( mcc ppΠ
mp
cp
mp
(c ), mc pp
** , mc pp
 
Consider first a sole increase in efficiency and denote the resulting equilibrium prices by 
( ).  As has been shown by Fudenberg and Tirole (1994) (see also Vives 2000, page 213-
217), the comparative statics with respect to e under the above assumptions are such that all 
prices decrease, competitors profits decrease, and consumers benefit.  In particular, we have 
 and , that is all prices fall
e
m
e
c pp ,
*
c
e
c pp <
**
c
e
c pp <
*
m
e
m pp <
e
m pp <
33. Consider now the effect of collusion, that is the m 
firms set their prices collusively.  Denote the post-merger equilibrium by , where 
 and .  There are two cases, depending on whether the efficiency or the 
collusion effect dominates. 
**** , mc pp
**
m
 
Case (i): Suppose , that is post-merger prices of the merging firms are higher. Given 
that prices are strategic complements, we also have that . Furthermore, we have 
***
mm pp <
***
cc pp <
 
),(),(),( ********* mccmccmcc pppppp Π<Π<Π . 
 
The first inequality is due to the assumption of substitutes (i.e.  is increasing in ) 
and the second is from the equilibrium definition of .  This implies that a merger yields 
higher profits for competitors, while consumers are hurt (all prices rise), i.e. CS  and 
.   
),( mcc ppΠ mp
**** , mc pp
0<
0>Πc
 
Case (ii): Suppose , that is post-merger prices of the merging firms fall.  Given that 
prices are strategic complements, we also have that . Furthermore, we have 
***
mm pp >
***
cc pp >
 
),(),(),( ********* mccmccmcc pppppp Π>Π>Π . 
 
                                                 
33 We use the symbol “<“ in matrix notation, i.e.  is true if and only if all pairwise comparisons of the 
price vectors are true.   
*
c
e
c pp <
 33 
 The first inequality is due the equilibrium definition of  and the second is from the 
assumption of substitutes. This implies that a merger yields lower profits for competitors, 
while consumers benefit (all prices fall) i.e.  and .  Q.E.D. 
**, mc pp
0<0>CS Πc
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 Appendix 2 - EU merger control: The Data 
 
We take the stock market and capitalization data before any news hits the market and when 
the merger is formally approved.  
 
First Step: Selection of merger cases 
We started by analyzing the EU decisions, which are available for the public on the internet at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases. We select all phase II mergers from the 
beginning of 1990 until December 2001.34 For some of the most recent cases the reports were 
not available, leaving us with a total of 90 phase II cases.  In order to obtain a representative 
sample we randomly selected a sub-sample of 110 phase I merger cases.35 For all these cases 
(200 in total) we collect information on the merging firms (such as name, location, world-
wide and EU-wide turnover36), the name of all reported competitors, the policy decision 
(Article, commitments/obligations/undertakings, notification and decision date), the 
geographic market of reference, and the product market of reference according to the NACE 
codes. 
 
Second step: The “announcement date” 
For each case we determined the first day that the merger appeared in the international press. 
This “announcement date” was found by using “Dow Jones interactive”, which is a 
customizable business news and research product that integrates content from newspapers, 
newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites.  
 
Third step: The construction of the “gains” variables.  
Stock market data for the day prior to the “announcement date” as well as on the 
announcement date was obtained from “Datastream”.  In particular, we collect data on the 
stock prices (Ri,t ) and number of shares (Sit) of all firms i (merging and competitors) for the 
two dates t and t-1.  In addition, we also collect information about a market index (Ii,t) for the 
sector and country that firm i belongs to. 37  
 
Based on this data, we construct the “gains from mergers” for both merging firms as well as 
competitors.  In particular, the cumulative return to the merging firms are calculated as 
follows,38: 
                                                 
34 The last phase II case in our database is M.2533 - BP / E.ON (final decision on 20.12.2001). 
35 We select these cases randomly in order to avoid sample selection problems. The last phase I case in our 
database is  M.2834 - ALCHEMY / COMPARE (final decision on 19.06.2002).  
36 For many cases this information is censored because the commission reported only a lower bound for the 
turnover. This lower bound is determined by the level of turnover which automatically triggers and 
Commission’s investigation (World-wide turnover above 5 billions Euro and EU-wide turnover above 2.5 
Billions Euro). 
37All prices have been transformed in constant 1995 Euro. Information about the exchange rates and the CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) were collected from the OECD statistical compendium. 
38 Several methods can be used to compute abnormal returns. Some authors estimate a Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) equation which regresses the stock return on a constant and the market return (or an industry 
index) over a sample which immediately precedes a window of about 100 days around the announcement. 
Abnormal returns before the announcement are then computed as the difference between actual returns and the 
predicted returns obtained from the estimated equation. For the part of the window which follows the 
announcement, a symmetric procedure is used (such that a second CAPM equation is estimated on a sample 
which immediately follows the windows and use to compute normal returns during the second part of the 
window). Abnormal returns are then cumulated over the span of the window to obtain a cumulated abnormal 
return.  A much simpler approach can be followed, in which the abnormal return is simply computed at the 
difference between the return on the stock and the return on an appropriate index on the day of announcement. 
Given the difficulty in obtaining unbiased parameter estimates in CAPM equations (in particular when the stock 
 35 
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while for the competitors we use, 
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When firms were not quoted, we used information from the “parent firm”.  For other case, we 
use information from the competitors when we had information about the relative importance 
of the missing firms as measured by their market shares. Still we are unable to construct 
reliable data for  and , such that we end up with 91 phase I cases and 73 phase II cases cΠ mΠ
39.  We are therefore left we final sample of 164 merger cases. 
                                                                                                                                                        
accounts for a significant proportion of the index), we have adopted this simpler approach. There is also some 
evidence (see Brown et al. (1985)) that the simple measure of abnormal returns that we use tend to be highly 
correlated with more sophisticated measures.  
39 These were cases for which we had stock market data for at least one of the merging firms and one of the 
competitors. 
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 Appendix 3 - EU merger cases (1990-2002) 
 
 
Case  Acquiring Firm Target Firm(s) Phase Decision date 
M.0004 Renault Volvo   1 07.11.90 
M.0012 Varta  Bosch 1   2 12.04.91 
M.0024 Mitsubishi Corp. Union Carbide 
Corp. 
  1 04.01.91 
M.0042 Alcatel Fiat   2 21.01.91 
M.0043 Fiat Alcatel   2 21.01.91 
M.0050 At&T Ncr Corporation   1 18.01.91 
M.0053 Boeing Alenia   2 04.06.91 
M.0057 Digital Equipment Int.  Mannesmann   1 22.02.91 
M.0068 Tetrapak 1 Alfa-Laval    2 19.03.91 
M.0081 Viag Continental Can   1 06.06.91 
M.0121 Ingersoll Rand Co. Dresser Inc.   1 18.12.91 
M.0126 Accor  Wagons-Lits    2 16.12.91 
M.0129 Digital Equipment Corp.  Philips Electronics   1 26.08.91 
M.0141 Uap Transatlantic 
HDG. 
  1 11.11.91 
M.0165 Alcatel Cable S.A.  Aeg Kabel    1 18.12.91 
M.0184 Gran Metropolitan  Cinzano S.A.   1 07.02.92 
M.0190 Nestle'  Eaux Vittel   2 25.03.92 
M.0214 Du Pont Imperial Chemical 
Industries  
  2 03.06.92 
M.0221 Asea Brown Boveri 
Limited 
Trafalgar Hse   1 26.05.92 
M.0222 Mannesmann Hoesch    2 14.07.92 
M.0236 Ericsson Ascom   1 08.07.92 
M.0253 Btr Pirelli   1 17.08.92 
M.0259 British Airways .   1 27.11.92 
M.0269 Shell Montedison   2 07.02.94 
M.0286 Zuerich Insurance 
Company 
Municipal Mutual 
Insurance 
  1 02.04.93 
M.0308 Kali Mdk 2   2 16.09.93 
M.0315 Mannesmann Vlourec  Dalmine   2 20.09.93 
M.0331 Fletcher Challenge Methanex   1 31.03.93 
M.0354 Cyanamid  Shell   1 01.10.93 
M.0358 Pilkington Societa' Italiana 
Vetro 2 
  2 02.09.93 
M.0430 Procter & Gamble Vp Schickedanz 1   2 17.02.94 
M.0437 Matra Marconi Space N.V.  British Aerospace 
Space 
Systems Ltd.  1 23.08.94 
M.0447 Schneider Electric S.A. AEG A.G.   1 01.08.94 
M.0458 Electrolux AEG A.G.    1 21.06.94 
M.0468 Siemens Italtel (Stet) 2   2 14.10.94 
M.0469 Bertelsmann Deutsche 
Bundespost 
Telekom 2 
  2 18.07.94 
M.0477 Daimler Benz Kässbohrer 1   2 14.10.94 
M.0484 Thyssen Stahl Acciai Speciali 
Asti , Afl Falck 1 
  2 21.10.94 
M.0498 Commercial Union  Suez   1 12.09.94 
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 M.0508 Credit Commercial De 
France (CCF) 
Berliner Handels 
Und Frankfurter 
Bank (BHF) 
  1 28.10.94 
M.0550 Union Carbide Corporation Enichem S.P.A.   1 13.03.95 
M.0580 Daimler Benz Asea Brown 
Boveri 
  2 23.06.95 
M.0582 Orkla As Volvo   2 23.05.95 
M.0603 Crown Cork & Seal 
Company 
Carnaudmetalbox 
Sa  
  2 25.07.95 
M.0619 Gencor  Lonmin   2 20.12.95 
M.0623 Kimberly-Clark  Scott Paper    2 12.09.95 
M.0632 Rhône Poulenc Rorer Inc. Fisons Plc.)    1 21.09.95 
M.0685 Siemens Lagardere   1 08.02.96 
M.0689 Singapore Telecom Belgacom   1 29.02.96 
M.0706 Alcatel Aeg   1 03.09.96 
M.0731 Kvaerner A.S. Trafalgar House 
Plc 
  1 15.04.96 
M.0737 Ciba-Geigy Sandoz   2 02.05.96 
M.0754 Anglo American Corp. Lonmin   2 16.12.96 
M.0774 Saint Gobain Hoechst Wacker   2 31.07.96 
M.0794 Coca-Cola Enterprises Cadbury 
Schweppes 
  2 13.09.96 
M.0798 General Electric Compunet 
Computer A.G. 
  1 19.08.96 
M.0818 Cardo Thyssen   1 02.12.96 
M.0833 Coca Cola Company  Carslberg A/S   2 02.05.97 
M.0850 Fortis Abn-Amro Bank   1 06.02.97 
M.0856 British Telecom Mci (Ii)    2 20.01.97 
M.0877 Boeing Mcdonnell 
Douglas  
  2 19.03.97 
M.0913 Siemens Elektrowatt    2 28.07.97 
M.0938 Guinness Grand 
Metropolitan  
  2 20.06.97 
M.0942 Veba Degusta   2 02.09.97 
M.0950 Roche (Boehringer 
Mannheim ) 
  2 02.10.97 
M.0954 Bain Capital Inc. Hoechst Ag   1 02.09.97 
M.0967 Klm .   1 22.09.97 
M.0970 Thyssen Krupp Stahl  Itw Signode   2 22.12.97 
M.0984 Dupont De Nemours & Co. Imperial Chemical Industries Plc.  1 02.10.97 
M.0986 Bayer Group Du Pont I De  
Nemours 
  2 09.10.97 
M.0993 Bertelsmann Taurus 
Entertainment 
Canal Plus 
  2 22.01.98 
M.1027 Deutsche Telekom Bertelsmann   2 29.01.98 
M.1042 Eastman Kodak Company  Dainippon Ink & 
Chamicals 
  1 15.01.98 
M.1069 Worldcom Mci    2 03.03.98 
M.1081 Dow Jones  General Electric   1 22.01.98 
M.1094 Caterpillar Lucas Varity   1 23.02.98 
M.1142 Commercial Union Plc  General Accident 
Plc 
  1 06.05.98 
M.1225 Enso Oyj Stora Kopparbergs 
Bergslags Ab 
  2 31.07.98 
M.1232 Ingram Tech Data   1 17.07.98 
M.1252 At&T Tele-
Commmunications 
Inc. 
  1 04.12.98 
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 M.1258 General Electric Finmeccanica   1 28.08.98 
M.1265 Chs Electronics Inc. Metro Ag   1 21.08.98 
M.1332 Thomson-CSF Lucas Varity Plc   1 21.12.98 
M.1363 Du Pont De Nemours & 
Co. 
Hoechst AG   1 05.02.99 
M.1383 Exxon Corporation Mobil Corporation   2 09.06.99 
M.1405 Tnt Post Group N.V. Jet Services Sa   1 15.02.99 
M.1452 Ford Motor Company Volvo Car 
Corporation  
  1 26.03.99 
M.1466 Eaton Corporation Aeroquip Vickers   1 31.03.99 
M.1476 Adecco S.A. Delphi    1 26.03.99 
M.1484 ALSTOM ABB Handels- und 
Verwaltungs AG 
  1 02.06.99 
M.1524 Airtours First Choice   2 03.06.99 
M.1532 Bp Amoco Plc. Atlantic Richfield 
Company  
  2 10.06.99 
M.1539  CVC European Equity II 
Ltd.  
Groupe DANONE 
S.A. 
GERRESHEIM
ER  Glas AG 
 1 05.07.99 
M.1551 AT&T Corp. MediaOne Group., 
Inc 
  1 23.07.99 
M.1561 Getronics N.V. Wang 
Laboratories Inc. 
  1 15.06.99 
M.1571  NEW HOLLAND N.V.  CASE 
Corporation 
  1 28.10.99 
M.1578 Sanitec Konink. Sphinx   2 03.08.99 
M.1596  ACCOR  S.A. The 
BLACKSTONE 
Group 
COLONY 
Capital Inc. 
VIVENDI 1 08.09.99 
M.1601 AlliedSignal Honeywell   2 01.12.99 
M.1628 Total Fina Elf Aquitaine   2 09.02.00 
M.1630 L'Air Liquide S.A. The BOC Group 
plc. 
  2 18.01.00 
M.1636 Matra Marconi Space  Astrium   2 21.03.00 
M.1641 Linde AG AGA AB   2 09.02.00 
M.1650 ACEA S.P.A. Telefonica   1 01.12.99 
M.1663 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. Alusuisse - Lonza 
Group AG 
  2 14.03.00 
M.1671 Dow Chemical Union Carbide   2 22.12.99 
M.1672 Ab Volvo Scania Ab   2 25.10.99 
M.1673 Veba Ag Viag Ag    2 04.02.00 
M.1687 Adecco SA Olsten 2   1 29.10.99 
M.1693 Alcoa Inc. Reynolds Metals 
Company 
  2 03.05.00 
M.1741 MCI WorldCom Sprint    2 28.06.00 
M.1789 INA Holding GmbH & Co 
KG 
LuK Group   1 22.12.99 
M.1797 Bae Systems+ Investor AB Celsius AB   1 04.02.00 
M.1806 Novartis AG AstraZeneca Plc.   2 26.07.00 
M.1845 AOL Time Warner   2 11.10.00 
M.1853 Electricite De France Oberschwäbische 
Elektrizitätswerke 
Beteiligungsgesell
schaft 
  2 07.02.01 
M.1871 Arrow Electronics Inc.  Tekelec   1 13.04.00 
M.1879 The Boeing Company Hughes 
Electronics 
Corporation (subs. 
General Motors) 
  2 27.09.00 
M.1882 Pirelli Cavi e Sistemi S.p. 
A
BICC General   2 19.07.00 
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 A. 
M.1892 Sara Lee 
Corporation 
Courtaulds 
Textiles plc 
  1 08.05.00 
M.1956 Ford Motor Company Autonova AB   1 24.05.00 
M.1982 Telia AB Oracle 
Corporation 
Drutt 
Corporation 
 1 11.09.00 
M.1990 Unilever PLC and Unilever 
N.V. 
Bestfood   1 28.09.00 
M.2020 Metsä-Serla Corporation Modo 
Paper AB 
  1 04.08.00 
M.2033 Svedala Industri AB Metso Corporation   2 24.01.01 
M.2041 United Airlines (UAL 
Corporation) 
US Airways 
Group Inc. 
  1 12.01.01 
M.2050 Vivendi S.A. Canal+ S.A. The Seagram 
Company 
Ltd. 
 1 13.10.00 
M.2059 Siemens AG DEMATIC  VDO SACHS 1 29.08.00 
M.2060 Robert Bosch GmbH Mannesmann 
Rexroth AG 
  2 13.12.00 
M.2097 SCA Mölnlycke Holding 
BV  
Metsä Tissue 
Corp. 
  2 31.01.01 
M.2116 Flextronics International 
Ltd. 
Italdata S.p.A.    1 25.09.00 
M.2187  Zellulosefaser Beteiligungs 
Gesellschaft mbH  
Lenzing AG   2 17.10.01 
M.2202 Stinnes AG (E.ON AG) Holland Chemical 
International N.V. 
  1 04.12.00 
M.2220  General Electric Corp. Honeywell  
International Inc. 
  2 03.07.01 
M.2283 Schneider Legrand   2 10.10.01 
M.2302 H.J. Heinz Company CSM NV   1 23.02.01 
M.2314 BASF AG Pantochim S.A.   2 11.07.01 
M.2333 Riverbank Sofidiv UK Ltd.   2 25.07.01 
M.2337 Nestlé S.A. Ralston Purina 
Company 
  1 27.07.01 
M.2389 Deutsche Shell GmbH RWE AG   2 20.12.01 
M.2416 Tetra Laval, S.A.  Sidel, S.A.   2 30.10.01 
M.2421 UMG-Beteiligungs-GmbH  Temic Telefunken 
microelectronic 
GmbH 
  1 11.06.01 
M.2434     2 26.09.01 
M.2498 UPM-Kymmene Haindlsche 
Papierfabriken 
KGaA 
  2 21.11.01 
M.2499 Norske Skog Parenco   2 21.11.01 
M.2504 Cadbury  Schweppes  plc Pernod 
Ricard S.A. 
  1 29.10.01 
M.2510 Cendant Corporation Galileo 
International, Inc. 
  1 24.09.01 
M.2533 British Petrol plc (BP) Veba Oil GmbH 
(E.ON) 
  2 20.12.01 
M.2577 General Electric Capital 
Corporation 
Heller Financial, 
Inc 
  1 23.10.01 
M.2598 TDC Mobile International 
A/S 
CMG Wireless 
Data Solutions 
B.V 
MIGway A/S  1 04.10.01 
M.2602 Gerling-Konzern 
Versicherungs-
Beteiligungs AG 
Nederlandsche 
Credietverzerkerin
g Maatschappij 
Holding N.V. 
  1 11.12.01 
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 M.2608 INA Holding Schaeffler 
KG  
FAG Kugelfischer 
Georg Schäfer AG  
  1 18.10.01 
M.2629 Flextronics International 
Ltd. 
Xerox Corporation   1  12.11.01 
M.2659 Fortum Oyj  Birka Energi AB   1 10.01.02 
M.2679 Electricité de France TXU EUROPE  24 SEVEN  1 20.12.01 
M.2693 Archer  Daniels  Midland 
Company 
Alfred C. 
Toepfer 
International 
GmbH 
  1 11.02.02 
M.2705 EnerSys 
Holdings Inc. 
Energy Storage 
Business 
  1 04.03.02 
M.2726 Koninklijke KPN N.V.  E-Plus Mobilfunk 
GmbH & Co. KG 
  1 07.03.02 
M.2738 General Electric Company Unison Industries 
Inc.  
  1 17.04.02 
M.2796 Siemens AG Aerolas GmbH   1 11.06.02 
M.2801 RWE Aktiengesellschaft   Innogy Holdings 
plc  
  1 17.05.02 
M.2804 Vendex KBB Nederland 
B.V. 
Brico Belgium 
S.A. 
  1 18.06.02 
M.2834 Alchemy 
Partners Ltd. 
CompAir  
Business 
  1 17.06.02 
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